更新: 114 个文件 - 2026-03-19 16:45:07
这个提交包含在:
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"title": "Next.js: HTTP request smuggling in rewrites",
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"summary": "## Summary\nWhen Next.js rewrites proxy traffic to an external backend, a crafted `DELETE`/`OPTIONS` request using `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` could trigger request boundary disagreement between the proxy and backend. This could allow request smuggling through rewritten routes.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker could smuggle a second request to unintended backend routes (for example, internal/admin endpoints), bypassing assumptions that only the configured rewrite destination/path is reachable. This does not impact applications hosted on providers that handle rewrites at the CDN level, such as Vercel. \n\n## Patches\nThe vulnerability originated in an upstream library vendored by Next.js. It is fixed by updating that dependency\u2019s behavior so `content-length: 0` is added only when both `content-length` and `transfer-encoding` are absent, and `transfer-encoding` is no longer removed in that code path.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrade is not immediately possible:\n- Block chunked `DELETE`/`OPTIONS` requests on rewritten routes at your edge/proxy.\n- Enforce authentication/authorization on backend routes per our [security guidance](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/guides/data-security).",
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"published_at": "2026-03-17T16:17:15Z",
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"updated_at": "2026-03-18T22:02:16.858114Z",
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"updated_at": "2026-03-19T17:59:01.302251Z",
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"severity": "medium",
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"cvss_score": 4.0,
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"exploit_status": "unknown",
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